Tamás Csönge
ABSTRACT:
The aim of this paper is to identify the reasons for the contradictory conclusions of the fictionalist and the realist theoretical positions on the ontological status of digital game objects. First, the applicability of the Waltonian notion of fiction regarding digital game objects and events is challenged. The paper clarifies that the debate contains a categorical misunderstanding, and that it is not really about the discursive quality of fictionality (or factuality), but about an ontological opposition between represented and real objects. It is then demonstrated that digital game objects belong to a special category of non-physical informational entities that realists rightly consider real because they exhibit systemic behaviour, but fictionalists are also correct regarding their function as signifiers of non-real, represented objects. Following Aarseth, a distinction is made between represented, simulated and real objects. It is argued that simulated digital game objects are real objects, but not necessarily the same kind of objects as those they represent: a virtual library is a library, but a virtual kitten is not a kitten. Finally, it is suggested that the main reason for the confusion about the existential status of game elements is an issue of descriptive language: a confusion between signifier and signified and the uniform designation of heterogeneous phenomena.
KEY WORDS:
descriptive language, digital games, fictionalism, realism, representationalism, simulation, virtuality.
DOI:
10.34135/actaludologica.2024-7-SI.16-33
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